Ch5-2 · 军备控制：SALT I 1972、ABM 条约与从未获批的 SALT II

How successful were the SALT treaties in limiting the nuclear arms race in the years 1972–79?

You may use the following in your answer and any other relevant examples:
• the ABM Treaty (1972)
• the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons (1972)
• the Vladivostok framework (1974)
• SALT II (1979)

中文意译：1972–79 年间，SALT 条约在限制核军备竞赛上有多成功？

Indicative content（建议论点）

• 支持"成功"：ABM 条约限各 2 处（1974 改为 1 处），消除"防御—先发制人"的不稳定；临时协定首次给 ICBM/SLBM 定量（SSBN/SLBM 740、ICBM 1,618 vs 1,054）；建立 SCC 常设协商机制；带动 1972/1974 莫斯科峰会、1973 华盛顿峰会与粮食贸易；把军备竞赛从"数量冲刺"变成"可管理的过程"
• 支持"不成功"：只限发射器不限弹头，MIRV 完全不在限制之内 → 1970s 双方核弹头总数反而翻倍；临时协定仅 5 年有效期；SALT II 高度技术化、被批评"参议员看不懂"；从未获参议院批准（1980.1 中止），第三世界冲突（伊朗、安哥拉、阿富汗）直接摧毁其政治基础
• 成功标准该怎么定（升档关键）：如果"成功"= 消灭核威胁，那 SALT 完全失败；如果"成功"= 为危险的竞争装上护栏、降低误判与成本，那它部分成功。答题时先定义 success 的尺子，是 L4/L5 的标志

1. 引言先定义"成功"：不要直接说"成功/不成功"。给两把尺子：① 是否削减了核武库（显然没有）；② 是否管理了军备竞赛（降低成本、减少误判、提供沟通渠道）。本文判断基于后者
2. 段落一：ABM 条约——最实质的成就：讲清"为什么限制防御反而更安全"这条反直觉逻辑，这是全场最亮的一段
3. 段落二：临时协定——数量上的冻结与它的代价：给出具体数字，并解释"为什么苏联可以多 564 枚 ICBM"（美国战略轰炸机与弹头领先）。这一句让答案有分析而非罗列
4. 段落三：MIRV 漏洞——为什么"限了等于没限"：1970 年 MIRV 服役、1970s 弹头翻倍。这是本题最重要的反方论据
5. 段落四：SALT II 的死亡——政治基础有多脆：海参崴框架 → 巡航导弹争议 → 杰克逊参议员 → 1979.6 签署 → 1979.12 阿富汗 → 1980.1 中止批准。务必区分 sign 与 ratify
6. 结论：SALT 在"管理"层面部分成功，在"削减"层面彻底失败；它的脆弱性说明——军控无法脱离整体政治关系而独立存活

Any judgement on the SALT treaties depends on what one expects arms control to do. If success means disarmament — a smaller nuclear arsenal and a reduced capacity for destruction — then SALT failed completely, because neither SALT I nor SALT II removed a single warhead. If, however, success is measured by whether the superpowers succeeded in managing a competition that both feared and could not afford, then the verdict is more favourable, though still heavily qualified. On that second measure, SALT achieved something real between 1972 and 1979, and then lost the political ground on which it stood.

The strongest achievement was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of May 1972, and its significance is easily misunderstood. It is instinctive to think of missile defences as a good thing, but strategically they were profoundly destabilising: if one side could intercept a retaliatory strike, it would acquire a powerful incentive to strike first. By limiting each side to two ABM sites — reduced to one in 1974 — the treaty deliberately preserved mutual vulnerability, and thereby preserved deterrence. This was arms control based on a paradox: safety through the certainty of destruction. Alongside it, the Interim Agreement froze the number of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles for five years, at 1,618 and 740 for the USSR and 1,054 and 740 for the United States. The Soviet Union was permitted more ICBMs because the United States held a large lead in strategic bombers and, more importantly, in warheads. Recognising this asymmetry is essential: SALT I was not generosity, but an attempt to balance two structurally different arsenals.

Yet the same agreement contained the flaw that would undermine it. Limits were placed on launchers, not on warheads, and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles — MIRVs — were left entirely unrestricted. Since a single missile could now carry several warheads, the totals that mattered continued to climb throughout the 1970s even as the numbers that had been frozen stayed still. Historians have called the Interim Agreement 'thin on substance', and the criticism is fair: each side retained the capacity to destroy the other several times over. What SALT limited was the most dangerous and most expensive edges of the race, not the race itself.

The fate of SALT II shows how dependent arms control was on the wider political climate. Its outline was agreed at Vladivostok in November 1974, but the exclusion of cruise missiles — an area of clear American advantage — guaranteed controversy. Senator Henry Jackson and his allies treated all arms control as a mechanism allowing the Soviet Union to catch up, and Carter's attempt in 1977 to reopen the terms and cut Soviet heavy missiles simply prolonged the negotiations. The treaty was eventually signed in Vienna in June 1979, but it was never ratified. Conflict in the Third World, in Iran, Angola and above all Afghanistan, destroyed the assumption of trust on which ratification depended, and in January 1980 the Senate's approval process was withdrawn. It is worth stressing that SALT II was signed and then abandoned, not rejected before signature: the chronology matters, because it shows that the diplomatic achievement was real and it was politics, not negotiation, that killed it.

In conclusion, the SALT treaties were a partial and reversible success. They did not end the arms race and, measured in warheads, barely slowed it; but they did establish that the race could be regulated, that both sides could accept limits verified by satellite rather than by inspectors, and that mutual vulnerability was preferable to the illusion of defence. Their collapse after 1979 confirms the central lesson of Détente: arms control cannot survive independently of the political relationship it is supposed to stabilise.

示范要点批注：① 引言用两把"尺子"定义 success，直接建立分析框架；② 解释 ABM 的反直觉逻辑（限防御 = 增稳定），是本文最亮的分析点；③ 用"为什么苏联 ICBM 更多"展示结构不对称的理解；④ 强调 sign vs ratify 的时序，体现精确性；⑤ 结论把 SALT 的命运上升到缓和的普遍教训。

• □ 引言是否先定义"success"的衡量标准
• □ 是否讲清 ABM 条约的反直觉逻辑（限制防御反而增强稳定）
• □ 是否给出具体数字（2 处 / 1,618 / 1,054 / 740；SALT II 2,250）
• □ 是否解释"为什么苏联 ICBM 更多"这个不对称
• □ 是否用 MIRV 漏洞作为核心反方论据
• □ 是否区分 sign 与 ratify，且时间顺序正确（1979.6 签 → 1979.12 阿富汗 → 1980.1 中止）
• □ 是否提到国内政治（杰克逊参议员、参议院）这一层
• □ 结论是否给出有层次的判断（partial and reversible success）