Alevel 历史 · Ch1-2 1920s–30s 互不信任

Blame for the post-Second World War breakdown in co-operation between the Big Three wartime allies may well be placed with Stalin's government in the Kremlin. American willingness to co-operate continued until 1947. This is evident from the fact that the Marshall Plan offer of American aid for a co-operative European recovery effort was made open to the Soviet Union. However, it seems clear that, around February or March 1946, Stalin actually decided to close the door on co-operation and adopt a policy of limited aggression. The beginning of the Cold War itself may be placed at the time of Stalin's decision or even at the more obvious date of Stalin's refusal to accept Marshall Plan Aid in July 1947. This is reinforced by events in Czechoslovakia; having accepted Marshall Plan Aid on 7 July, Czechoslovakia was forced to reverse the decision by Stalin's direct order on 10 July.

In 1946, the Soviets refused to accept American efforts to negotiate international nuclear control through the UN. Just like the Soviet refusal of American loans and economic co-operation, this provides some evidence of Stalin's non-co-operative state of mind. This evidence became overwhelming in 1947 and 1948, when Soviet aggression began to appear along a line stretching from Germany, across Asia, to the Far East.

Extract 1 核心观点：Stalin 是责任方——美国 1947 年前愿合作（Marshall Plan 向苏开放），但 Stalin 1946.2-3 决定关门、拒绝 Marshall Aid、强迫捷克反转、拒绝 UN 核控制，1947-48 苏联侵略从德国延伸到远东。

Soviet policy at the end of the Second World War indicated that Stalin saw the need to reach some kind of agreement with the USA. The Soviets did not emerge from the War with a determination to take over eastern Europe and then embark on a 'cold war' with the USA.

However, Stalin's efforts to solve the problems of Soviet security and recovery without conflict with the USA were not matched by the American government that came to power on the death of Roosevelt. President Truman was an enthusiastic and militant advocate of America's supremacy in the world. From a very early date, Truman compared Stalin's Russia to Hitler's Germany and made it very clear that he intended to reform the world on American terms.

Truman's foreign policy did not become an ideological war against the Soviet Union and international communism until the end of 1946. However, a determination to be strong when dealing with the Soviets existed from the beginning. Additional US aid to Russia was cancelled in May 1945. The action seriously antagonised the Russians and Stalin interpreted it as a US move to put pressure on him to accept American policies.

President Truman initiated a vigorous attempt to undermine Stalin's October 1944 agreement with Churchill to divide up post-war Europe into spheres of influence. Truman wanted to replace the agreement with a policy of openness, particularly open trade.

Extract 2 核心观点：Stalin 本意合作——问题出在 Truman。Truman 把 Stalin 比作 Hitler、1945.5 取消对苏援助、试图破坏 Stalin-Churchill 1944 势力范围协议、推行"开放"政策。1946 年底 Truman 外交才演变为意识形态战争。

Section A 满分 25 分，分五个 Level。考试目标：AO1（5 分）知识组织 + AO3（20 分）史料分析与评价。

冲 Level 5 关键：① 分析两段 Extract 作者的论点基础（为什么 Quigley 1968 偏向责斯大林、Williams 1972 偏向责 Truman——时代背景与史观差异）；② own knowledge 精确选材充分展开；③ 持续评价而非堆砌——每个证据都要回扣"how far agree"。

题型：Section A Source 分析题（含两段 Extract），25 分。需用 Extracts + own knowledge，对"Stalin 是否负全责"做出评价。

Indicative Content 官方给出两栏论证框架：

角度一：Support（Stalin 有责）

• Extract 1 论点：Stalin 1946.2-3 决定关门、拒绝合作；1947.7 拒 Marshall Aid 并逼迫捷克反转；1946 拒 UN 核控制（Baruch Plan）；1947-48 苏联侵略从德国延伸到远东。
• own knowledge 补充：Stalin 1946.2 在莫斯科公开演讲宣称共产主义与资本主义根本对立、未来战争是概率事件；苏联在欧洲维持军事存在利用美军快速复员；1946 拒 Baruch Plan、策划苏联版 Marshall Plan；1946-48 干预柏林、捷克、伊朗、中国。

角度二：Counter / Modify（Stalin 并非唯一/主要责任方）

• Extract 2 论点：Stalin 本意合作，是 Truman 上台后态度转变——1945.5 取消对苏援助、推翻 Stalin-Churchill 1944 百分比协议、1946 底外交演变为意识形态战争。
• own knowledge 补充：Truman 1945.4 对 Molotov 粗暴态度、Roosevelt 死后政策转硬；1947 杜鲁门主义+马歇尔计划是美国主动发起意识形态对抗；英国工党政府对苏意外强硬；Molotov 而非 Stalin 推动苏联强硬路线；丘吉尔铁幕演说刺激 Stalin。

结构建议（四段式 · 冲 Level 5）：

① 引言 + 论点：Extract 1（Quigley 1968）从苏联行为证据指向 Stalin 责任，Extract 2（Williams 1972）从美国政策转向指向 Truman 责任——两者各执一端，需结合 own knowledge 权衡。论点：Stalin 确是重要推动者，但"to blame"暗示单方主责——更准确应是双方共同责任，且 Truman 1945 年后的强硬政策是不可忽视的催化变量。

② Support（Stalin 有责）：引 Extract 1——Stalin 1946.2-3 "决定关门"是关键节点；拒 Marshall Aid（1947.7）+ 逼捷克反转是直接证据；own knowledge 补 1946.2 Stalin 演讲+buffer zone 坚持拒自由选举+y将东欧苏联化。

③ Counter（Truman/西方有责）：引 Extract 2——Truman 1945.5 取消对苏援助、推翻百分比协议、1946 底外交意识形态化；own knowledge 补 1945.4 Truman 对 Molotov 粗暴、1947 杜鲁门主义主动发起意识形态对抗、英国工党政府对苏强硬、铁幕演说刺激。

④ 结论：Extract 1 与 Extract 2 的史观差异本身揭示冷战起源是解释之争而非单方责任事实。Stalin 的疑心与东欧控制欲是推动破裂的直接力量（1946-49 可见行为证据最多），但 Truman 上台后的政策转向同样关键（1945-46 行为证据）。"Stalin was to blame"的断言忽略了大同盟脆弱性的结构根源——1917 以来互不信任+战时临时同盟敌人消失即崩。更准确的判断：Stalin 是破裂的主要推动者之一，但非唯一责任方；Truman 的强硬政策催化了本已脆弱的同盟走向崩溃。

加分点：点出 Extract 1（1968，冷战早期正统派 Quigley）与 Extract 2（1972，修正派 Williams）的史观差异——1968 冷战高峰期倾向责苏，1972 越战+水门后美国自我批判倾向责美。分析作者史观背景是 Level 5 的核心要求。

Introduction

Extract 1, written by C Quigley in 1968 during the height of the Cold War, places blame for the post-war breakdown firmly on Stalin, arguing that the Soviet leader 'decided to close the door on co-operation' around February-March 1946 and pursued a deliberate policy of 'limited aggression'. Extract 2, by W A Williams in 1972 during the Vietnam era, contends the opposite: that 'Soviet policy at the end of the Second World War indicated that Stalin saw the need to reach some kind of agreement' and that the real change came with Truman, who 'compared Stalin's Russia to Hitler's Germany'. These contrasting interpretations reflect broader historiographical debates — Quigley writes from an orthodox perspective that attributes the Cold War primarily to Soviet expansionism, while Williams, writing in the revisionist tradition influenced by America's Vietnam experience, emphasises US responsibility. While Stalin's actions from 1946 onwards undoubtedly accelerated the breakdown of the Big Three alliance, the view that he was solely 'to blame' is difficult to sustain: Truman's harder line from 1945, the structural legacy of pre-war mutual distrust, and the inherent fragility of the wartime alliance all contributed to the rupture.

Paragraph 1 — Supporting the view (Stalin's responsibility)

Extract 1 provides substantial evidence that Stalin's own decisions were a direct cause of the breakdown. Quigley's claim that 'American willingness to co-operate continued until 1947' is supported by the fact that the Marshall Plan offer was initially open to the Soviet Union, and that Stalin's refusal of Marshall Aid in July 1947 — and his forcing of Czechoslovakia to reverse its acceptance within three days — demonstrated a deliberate closure of the door to economic co-operation. Stalin's February 1946 speech in Moscow, in which he declared that communism and capitalism were 'fundamentally opposed' and that a future war was a probability, corroborates Quigley's assertion that Stalin 'decided to close the door on co-operation' at precisely this time. Furthermore, Stalin's refusal of the 1946 Baruch Plan for international nuclear control through the UN, his maintenance of a large Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe while American troops rapidly demobilised, and Soviet interventions in Berlin, Czechoslovakia, Iran and China between 1946 and 1948 all lend weight to the view that Stalin was actively pursuing a policy of aggression rather than being pushed into defensiveness. The consolidation of Soviet-friendly regimes in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, in direct contravention of the Yalta promise of free elections, provided the most visible evidence of expansionism that confirmed Western suspicions.

Paragraph 2 — Counter and modifying the view (Truman and Western responsibility)

However, Extract 2 persuasively argues that 'Stalin's efforts to solve the problems of Soviet security and recovery without conflict with the USA were not matched by the American government that came to power on the death of Roosevelt'. Williams's observation that Truman 'compared Stalin's Russia to Hitler's Germany' is significant: this was not merely a personal reaction but a framing that shaped US policy from the outset. The cancellation of additional US aid to Russia in May 1945, just months after Roosevelt's death, signalled a dramatic departure from Roosevelt's co-operative approach. Truman's confrontational meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in April 1945, where he delivered a tirade about broken Yalta promises, reinforced Stalin's suspicion that the new president was hostile. Williams's contention that Truman 'initiated a vigorous attempt to undermine Stalin's October 1944 agreement with Churchill to divide up post-war Europe into spheres of influence' is also supported by subsequent US policy: the Truman Doctrine of March 1947 and the Marshall Plan of June 1947, whatever their humanitarian justification, functioned as instruments of ideological confrontation — the open declaration of containment as official US policy. The British Labour government under Attlee, despite its socialist credentials, proved 'unexpectedly hostile' toward Stalin, and Churchill's Iron Curtain speech of March 1946 further poisoned the atmosphere. These factors suggest that the breakdown was not solely Stalin's doing: the USA made choices that escalated tension rather than defusing it.

Paragraph 3 — Structural factors beyond both leaders

Neither extract fully accounts for the deeper structural causes of the breakdown. The wartime alliance had always been a marriage of convenience, held together only by the common Nazi enemy. The ideological hostility dating back to 1917, the memory of Western intervention in the Russian Civil War, the legacy of appeasement and the Munich Agreement of 1938, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 had created a reservoir of mutual distrust that no single leader could have overcome. Roosevelt's death removed the one leader with both the inclination and the personal authority to sustain co-operation; his replacement by Truman was not a free choice but a constitutional accident that shifted the balance. Equally, Stalin's suspicion of Western motives was not paranoia but a rational reading of a century of Russian history — two world wars begun by invasions from the west, a civil war featuring foreign intervention, and a Munich Agreement from which the USSR was excluded. The Grand Alliance was thus structurally fragile before either Stalin's post-war decisions or Truman's harder line sealed its fate.

Conclusion

While Extract 1 is correct that Stalin's actions from 1946 — the February speech, the rejection of Marshall Aid, the forcing of Czechoslovakia, the refusal of the Baruch Plan — were the most visible and proximate causes of the breakdown, the claim that Stalin was 'to blame' implies a single-agent causation that the evidence does not support. Extract 2 demonstrates that Truman's cancellation of aid in May 1945, his dismissal of the percentages agreement, and the ideological turn in US policy by late 1946 were not merely reactive but helped create the very conditions that made Stalin's harder line more likely. The contrasting perspectives of Quigley (1968, orthodox) and Williams (1972, revisionist) reflect the fact that the breakdown was not the product of one leader's choices but of a complex interaction between Soviet security-seeking, American ideological assertiveness, British encouragement of a harder Western line, and a legacy of pre-war distrust. Stalin bore significant responsibility as the leader whose post-war actions most visibly dismantled the framework of co-operation, but Truman's policy shift was an indispensable co-cause; the more defensible judgement is that the breakdown of the Big Three alliance was a shared responsibility, with Stalin the primary but not the sole agent.